OTT (Commentary) -- 15

40 The mind would not be able to see the place of God in itself not having become higher than all <mental representations> which are in [sensible] objects. It will not become higher, however, if it does not unclothe itself of the passions, which are what, by means of the mental representations, bind it together with the sensible objects. And the passions it will lay aside by means of the virtues; the mere thoughts, then, by means of spiritual contemplation; and this [i.e. spiritual contemplation], again, when, during the time of prayer, that light shines upon the mind that works in relief the place which is of God.

This chapter is parallel to Skemmata 23.

This very important passage should now be clear, but, because of its very great importance, let us discuss it in detail.

This chapter is a summary of Evagrius’ contemplative psychology. Recall that in the first instance, the mind (nous) receives by means of the bodily sense organs the mental representations of objects of sense. It can later recall such an object of sense by means of the memory, and the result is a recollection that is a mental representation of the object recalled. Both the initial sense-perception, or mental representation, of an object of sense and its recollection can be either impassioned or unimpassioned, depending on the purity of the ascetic. Moreover, when a demon approaches the ascetic to excite the one of the eight passions for which it has its work or function (ergon), then there commences in the ascetic’s mind (nous) an impassioned mental representation of an object of sense, brought forth to the mind (nous) by the memory, but charged with the passion that has been aroused by the demon. This is the basis of the demonic thought (logismos), and it is against these passionately charged mental representations and thoughts (logismoi) that the immaterial war is fought that is the subject of TPL and OTT.

Recall that it is possible to have a recollection of an object of sense that is uncharged by passion: these are the ‘mere’ recollections of objects of sense. Recall also that when in the Evagrian system the ascetic attains to dispassion (apatheia), then he can enter into the second natural contemplation, which is the contemplation of the reasons (logoi) of objects of sense. This requires the sensible presence of the object. However, the actual object of contemplation in the second natural contemplation is the reason (logos) of the object of sense, and this itself is not sensible but intelligible: the mental representation of the reason (logos) of the sensible object is of an intelligible, the reason (logos) of the object.

Later, when the mind (nous) of the ascetic becomes still more purified, the ascetic can enter into the first natural contemplation, the contemplation of angels. As we have seen in the interpretation of St Isaac the Syrian,[1] when the ascetic enters into first natural contemplation, he divests himself of the senses. Now the angels are living beings (minds or noes), but they are not sensible: they are intelligible. Hence, the ascetic is no longer contemplating sensible things at all.

Finally, after the ascetic has acquired the contemplation of the angelic powers as his own, the contemplation of the reasons (logoi) of the angelic powers as his own, and the other contemplations of the first natural contemplation, not well defined by Evagrius, as his own, then he can begin the transformation to Theology that we have just been discussing.

It is important to understand that the mental representations that are involved in second natural contemplation, first natural contemplation, and Theology are not the mental representations of sensible objects. They are the mental representations of intelligible things: the reasons (logoi) of sensible objects, the angels themselves, the reasons (logoi) of the angels, God himself. Moreover, these mental representations correspond each of them to the gnosis that the ascetic receives into his mind (nous) in that particular contemplation, at that particular stage of contemplation.

Now what this chapter of OTT is saying is that the mind (nous) will be unable to see the place of God in itself—will be unable to engage in Theology, will be unable to pass to the gnosis of the Holy Trinity—if it does not become higher than all mental representations of sensible objects. In the interpretation of St Isaac the Syrian, the critical transformation for this ‘becoming higher’ is the third transformation, that from the second natural to the first natural contemplation, for it is there that the ascetic divests himself of the senses. Although divesting oneself of the senses is not precisely the same thing as becoming higher than all mental representations of sensible objects—since ‘mere’ unimpassioned recollections of objects of sense may still enter the mind (nous)—it clearly is a very important part of it.

We understand the reason that the ascetic must become higher than all mental representations of sensible objects in order to attain to Theology to be, crudely put, that the mental representations of sensible objects clutter the mind. Recall the phrase in OTT 6: ‘so that Jesus turns aside, there being a crowd of mental representations in the place of the intellect’. That phrase has precisely this import: God cannot find any room for himself in the intellect which is cluttered by the mental representations of sensible objects.

So the first thing that Evagrius is saying in this passage is that the ascetic who wishes to attain to Theology, to seeing the condition of his mind (nous) as the ‘place of God’, must put off the mental representations of sensible objects.

Evagrius next turns to answer the question: ‘How is this done?’ He points out that this is only possible if the mind (nous)—it would be clearer to say, the ascetic—unclothes itself (himself) of the passions, since the passions are what by means of the mental representations bind the mind (nous) of the ascetic to sensible objects. What does Evagrius mean by this? Recall that the passions all call the ascetic to a pleasure of the senses, which is necessarily a pleasure related to some object of sense. Hence, the passions bind the ascetic to sensible objects for the sake of the pleasures of the senses that they give him. The mechanism by which the passions do that is the impassioned mental representation, the impassioned recollection, of the object of sense. We have already seen Evagrius explain what an impassioned mental representation is. So long, Evagrius is saying, as the ascetic is passionate, he will have impassioned mental representations of objects of sense that call him to pleasures of the senses. These impassioned mental representations will bind him to objects of sense. They will prevent him from attaining to the mental representations of intelligibles such as the reasons (logoi) of created objects, angels, the reasons (logoi) of the angels, and so on. The mental representations of objects of sense block the mental representations of intelligibles. Hence, the ascetic must attain to dispassion (apatheia) so that the passions no longer bind him to objects of sense by means of the impassioned mental representations. He must then progress further, through a complete divestiture of the senses in the passage from second to first natural contemplation, so as to free himself even of unimpassioned mental representations of objects of sense. Then he is in a position to ascend to God. Recall that St Thomas Aquinas denied the natural possibility of what Evagrius is delineating here, although St Augustine had a doctrine similar to that of Evagrius, of the intuitive cognition by the ‘intelligence’ of the eternal reasons in the Mind of God, of the light of God and of the substance of God.[2]

So, for Evagrius, the first purification is the purification of the passionate part of the soul from the passions; this is what enables the ascetic to leave sensible objects behind. Recall that in the Evagrian system the presupposition of entry into the second natural contemplation is the attainment of dispassion (apatheia). Here Evagrius is discussing the matter from the point of view of contemplative psychology and explaining why, from that point of view, attainment to dispassion (apatheia) is the precondition of the second natural contemplation: only by freeing himself from impassioned attachments to objects of sense and therefore from the impassioned mental representations associated with them can the ascetic begin to receive the mental representations of intelligibles into his mind (nous). The mental representations of the reasons (logoi) of material objects that the ascetic receives into his mind (nous) during the second natural contemplation are the first mental representations of intelligibles that he has received in his ascetical career. But to receive them into his mind (nous), he must no longer be bound to objects of sense the way he was when he was passionate. However, the mind (nous) of the ascetic is still imperfect: the ascetic still must have the object sensibly before him in order intuitively to apprehend the object’s intelligible reason (logos).

We recognize that Evagrius understands that natural contemplation is a matter of purification, so that the mental representations that the ascetic experiences in natural contemplation gradually become more divorced from objects of sense: with regard to the mental representations received into the intellect, there is not such a sharp break between the attainment to dispassion (apatheia) and the entry into second natural contemplation as what we have just said might give the reader to understand; this is indicated by the facts that in second natural contemplation the object must still be sensibly present to the ascetic for him to engage in the contemplation and that in the early stages of second natural contemplation the ascetic experiences difficulty in maintaining the contemplation.

So, from the point of view of contemplative psychology, dispassion (apatheia) is in the Evagrian system a precondition of entry into second natural contemplation because only by dispassion (apatheia) will the ascetic be freed from impassioned attachments to objects of sense and from their impassioned recollections. Now Evagrius goes on. Having been freed by means of dispassion (apatheia) from objects of sense and their impassioned mental representations, the ascetic is still faced with the presence in his mind of unimpassioned ‘mere’ mental representations of objects of sense, especially given that the sensible presence of the object is necessary in the second natural contemplation to support the contemplation of the reason (logos) of the object. However, to contemplate properly the various higher intelligible objects of contemplation, especially God himself,[3] the ascetic must be freed even from those ‘mere’ unimpassioned mental representations of objects of sense. How? Recall St Isaac the Syrian’s interpretation that in passing from the second natural contemplation to the first natural contemplation, the ascetic divests himself of the senses. Here, Evagrius says ‘by spiritual contemplation’, surely saying the same thing. What is involved is the passage to first natural contemplation, especially in its higher stages. It is worthwhile here to recall the many passages of Evagrius where he remarks that when the ascetic has encountered the angelic powers in contemplation, then he completely forgets this world of sense, he completely despises the impassioned pleasures of the senses and he turns his whole attention to the world of contemplation which has been opened up to him.[4] This is how the present passage is to be understood, the one which says that the ascetic puts off ‘the mere thoughts by means of spiritual contemplation’: from the second natural contemplation, putting off the senses, the ascetic enters into the contemplation of the angels; then by means of the higher stages of first natural contemplation, those of the reasons (logoi) of the angelic powers, the contemplation of all the worlds and so on, he is progressively purified of the ‘mere’ unimpassioned mental representations of sensible objects, including their recollections, until he should be ready to enter into Theology. Recall the passages of the Kephalaia Gnostica that we saw in the Digression where Evagrius speaks of the soaring mystical ascent through all the worlds, where he compares the mind (nous) of the ascetic to a bird flying from tree to tree, stopping briefly to savour the scent of the leaves and of the fruits and then pressing on to the tree of life.[5] This is the spiritual contemplation that Evagrius is here referring to.

As we have construed the text, then, when the ascetic makes the final passage, the fourth transformation from first natural contemplation to Theology, he puts off even the mental representations of the first natural contemplation and at that time ‘that light shines upon the mind that works in relief the place of God’: the ascetic has entered into pure prayer, mystical union with God. It should be understood that it is by a certain abuse of language that in the above discussion we have spoken of the mental representation of God: the light that shines upon the mind to work in relief the place of God is beyond all mental representations of created things.

Let us now look at some chapters from the Skemmata that discuss the above matters in relation to Evagrius’ doctrine of prayer:

25 We have clearly learned from the holy David what is the place of God. For he says: ‘His place has come to be in peace, and his dwelling place in Zion.’ [Ps. 75, 2.] The place of God, then, is a reasonable soul; the dwelling place, however, is a mind (nous) in the form of light which has denied worldly desires and which has been taught to regard the reasons (logoi) of the soul.

Note that the place of God is the reasonable soul: in Evagrius’ thinking, in Theology or pure prayer there is no distinction between the subject, the mind (nous) experiencing the gnosis of God, and the object, God himself who is essential gnosis. Note that the dwelling place of God is the mind which has been made light-like by God, which has denied worldly desires in attaining to dispassion (apatheia), and which has entered into first natural contemplation—this is how we construe ‘and which has been taught to regard the reasons (logoi) of the soul’: as the contemplation of the reasons (logoi) of the reasonable beings, the higher stage of first natural contemplation.

2 If anyone should wish to see the condition of the mind (nous), let him deprive himself of all mental representations (noemata), and then he will see the mind (nous) similar to sapphire or to the colour of Heaven [cf. Exod. 24, 9–11]. To do this without dispassion (apatheia) is one of those things which are impossible. For there is a need of God who works together and who breathes upon the mind (nous) the light which is related [to God].

Note the necessity of grace: the light related to God is infused by God into the mind (nous).

4 The condition of the mind (nous) is an intelligible height similar to the colour of Heaven, to which [mind (nous)] the light of the Holy Trinity also comes during the time of prayer.

As R. E. Sinkewicz points out,[6] Skemmata 2 and 4 are quoted by St Gregory Palamas, as sayings of St Neilos the Ascetic, in the work To Xene on the Passions and Virtues.[7] It is remarkable to us that St Gregory has quoted on the one occasion OTT 39[8] and on the other occasion Skemmata 2 and 4—literally in both cases—, given that the passages are so similar.

6 The censer is the pure mind (nous) not touching a sensible thing during the time of prayer. In respect of virtue, we will be one on the eighth day; in respect of gnosis, however, we will be one on the last day.

The first sentence is a reiteration of the previous chapter, Skemmata 2. The second sentence is a clear assertion by Evagrius that in the General Resurrection we will all attain to dispassion (apatheia) whereas in the Restoration we will all attain to gnosis of the Unity.[9]

26 Prayer is a condition of the mind (nous) which is destructive of every earthly mental representation (noema).

This is very important for its clear statement that in pure prayer the mind (nous) is free of all impassioned and even unimpassioned mental representations of objects of sense: we take ‘earthly’ to refer not only to impassioned but also to unimpassioned mental representations of objects of sense. In the highest form of prayer, the mind (nous) is free even of the mental representations of the reasons (logoi) of objects of sense.

27 Prayer is a condition of the mind (nous) occurring only from the light of the Holy Trinity.

Although Evagrius may not always have been absolutely certain of the relation of the light of the mind to the light of God, in his later works—if, given its very dense and elevated content, we can take the Skemmata to be a late work of Evagrius—he clearly takes the view that the light of prayer is a light of the Holy Trinity itself. This, with the proper modifications, accords with Orthodox doctrine.

34 The mind (nous) is a temple of the Holy Trinity.

20 The mind (nous) which is in the practical life (praktike) is in the mental representations (noemata) of this world. The mind (nous) which is in [natural] gnosis sojourns in [natural] contemplation. When the mind (nous) comes to be in a state of prayer, it is in an imageless [state], which very thing is called the place of God. The mind (nous) will therefore see the coessentiality and the hetero-essentiality in the [sensible] bodies, the [hetero-essentiality] which is in the [natural] contemplations (theoremata), and the [coessentiality] which is in God, which very thing [sc. hetero-essentiality], concerning God, is clearly among those things which are impossible, the essential gnosis being <immaterial (aülos)> and there being no variation at all in regard to essential gnosis.

This passage is extremely important for its identification of pure prayer with Theology, unitive prayer to the Holy Trinity. The first three sentences outline the three stages of gnosis: the first stage, that of the practical life, is to be taken to be the ordinary sense-perception of objects of sense; the second stage is natural contemplation in its various degrees; and the third stage, Theology, is to be identified with pure prayer. The last sentence is somewhat difficult. It describes the gnosis of the Holy Trinity, which itself is essential gnosis: this gnosis is ‘immaterial (aülos)’ and characterized by a lack of variation. Essential gnosis—mystical knowledge of the Holy Trinity—does not have the variation associated with the ordinary sense-perception of objects or even with the natural contemplations. That is because God himself is One. Moreover, it is well to recall that Evagrius clearly teaches in the Kephalaia Gnostica that all contemplations have an underlying object of contemplation except for the contemplation of the Holy Trinity, which does not. Because there is no underlying object in the contemplation of the Holy Trinity, and because God is One, we have construed the text to say that ‘hetero-essentiality’—this corresponds to a plurality of objects in the contemplation, or even to a variation from time to time in the object being contemplated—is that which is impossible in the contemplation concerning God. We have also emended the text on the basis of sense and on the basis of Evagrius’ doctrine elsewhere, from ‘obscure (adulos)’ to ‘immaterial (aülos)’. If we were to accept the reading of the text, it would be unclear how we were to understand Evagrius’ assertion that the essential gnosis is ‘obscure (adulos)’. While this clearly would give an apophatic cast to Evagrius’ doctrine, the relative absence of such an apophatic element in his writings makes it difficult for us to believe that the text is correct. The reading we propose is consistent with Evagrius’ doctrine in many places in the Kephalaia Gnostica, and is a matter, as can be seen, of a one-letter difference in the two words, surely a matter of a copyist’s error.

We are now in a position to grasp the meaning of Skemmata 18:

18 In the [sensible] bodies, then, there is both coessentiality (homoousiotes) and hetero-essentiality (heteroousiotes); in the bodiless powers, however, only coessentiality (homoousiotes). In the [natural] gnoses, then, there is hetero-essentiality (heteroousiotes), for no one of the [natural] contemplations is the same, <if indeed> there is a contemplation of the stars [cf. 1 Cor 15, 41]. In [the contemplation of] the Trinity, however, there is only coessentiality (homoousiotes), for again there are not at all various underlying objects [in the contemplation of the Trinity], as in the [natural] contemplations. Again, neither is [the Trinity] constituted from a multiplicity of essences, as among the bodies. Essences (ousies), I say now, are those which contribute to the construction of the definition (oros) which declares the ‘what it is’ (to ti einai) of the underlying object. But neither [is the Trinity] as among the bodiless powers, even if we say that the bodiless powers are coessential (homoousia) on account of their being receptive of the same gnosis.

What Evagrius is explaining in this chapter, as regards pure prayer, is that some sensible bodies have the same essence as others, whereas other sensible bodies have different essences. This can be considered a matter of Classical and especially Aristotelian philosophy. Next, Evagrius says, in the natural contemplations, there is a multiplicity of essences because the natural contemplations are all different the one from the other: the contemplation of the reason (logos) of a tree, for example, is different from the contemplation of an angel or a star. Evagrius himself adduces as a reason for this multiplicity the fact that there is a contemplation of each star, alluding to the passage of St Paul that the stars differ from one another in glory. But, Evagrius goes on, there is a unity of essence in the contemplation of the Holy Trinity because there are no underlying objects in the contemplation of the Holy Trinity—just as we have been discussing. Evagrius continues that in the Holy Trinity there is not a multiplicity of essences as there is among sensible bodies. This is a matter of Cappadocian Trinitarian theology, something Evagrius would have taken with him from Constantinople to Egypt. He then explains, in Classical philosophical terminology, what an essence is. This definition is quite useful since it helps us to understand what the reason (logos) of an object is, and what the contemplation of that reason (logos) must be: the reason (logos) is the definition (oros) which declares what the object really is, its essence, and the contemplation must be the intuitive cognition by the ascetic of that definition as it is expressed in the wisdom of God manifest in creation. Evagrius then points out that although all the reasonable beings are of the same essence,[10] that is because they are all capable of the same gnosis, ultimately the gnosis of the Holy Trinity; and that is not the same thing as the Holy Trinity’s having a unity of essence: both the logikoi and the Holy Trinity are of one essence but for different reasons.

To summarize, we can say that sensible bodies have a variety of essences and that some sensible bodies have the same essence whereas other sensible bodies do not. Reasonable beings, however, all have the same essence, even though they might have a different glory or spiritual attainment, because they all were created with the capacity to receive the gnosis of God. God himself is of one essence, and hence has a unity of essence, but for a different reason from the unity of essence of the reasonable beings. Moreover, the contemplation of God has a single essence; that is, there is no variation in the mystical union of the ascetic with God, no variation in the ascetic’s experience of pure prayer, no variation in his contemplation of the Unity: there is only one such experience, and for these two reasons: there is no underlying object in the contemplation of the Trinity and there is no variation in the substance, the essence, of the Trinity itself.

If we consider that in the Evagrian system, the mental representation is the vehicle by which a contemplation introduces the related gnosis into the mind (nous) of the ascetic, then we can conclude that where there is a unity of essence, then the related mental representations are one in essence, and where there is a multiplicity of essences, then the related mental representations are many in essence. This consideration should illuminate the next passage of the Skemmata:

22 The mind (nous) at one time passes from a mental representation (noema) to other mental representations (noemata), at another time from a contemplation (theorema) to other contemplations (theoremata), and at another time from a contemplation (theorema) to mental representations (noemata). There is also the time when it even passes from the imageless condition to mental representations (noemata) or contemplations (theoremata) and again runs back from these to the imageless condition. This occurs to the mind (nous) during the time of prayer.

This chapter of the Skemmata is extremely important for its discussion of the comportment of the mind (nous) of the ascetic during the times of contemplation and prayer. In this passage, ‘contemplation’ refers to any of the natural contemplations and the ‘imageless condition’ to the state of pure prayer, or Theology, where the mind (nous), being divested of all mental representations, has become the ‘place of God’ or the ‘dwelling of God’. The difference in this passage between a ‘contemplation (theorema)’ and a ‘mental representation (noema)’ is not entirely clear; Evagrius seems to have in mind different kinds of natural contemplation. Possibly a contemplation (theorema) is a more verbal, dogmatic contemplation than a mental representation, but this is strictly conjectural, since nowhere else that we are aware of does Evagrius make such a distinction.

Evagrius has the following argument in Skemmata 22: The mind (nous) must be doing something; it cannot be idle.[11] Moreover, in the highest states of contemplation and prayer, the mind (nous) moves among the various states: from one mental representation (noema) to another (various states and levels of natural contemplation); from a mental representation to a contemplation (theorema) (from one sort of natural contemplation to another); from the imageless state (pure prayer or Theology) to mental representations (noemata) or contemplations (theoremata) and back again to the imageless state (pure prayer or Theology).[12] Evagrius does not have a doctrine of the freezing of the mind (nous) in a certain contemplation.

The remaining three chapters are somewhat peripheral to our concerns; we include them merely for the sake of a complete portrait of Evagrian prayer:

28 Entreaty (deesis) is the conversation, with supplication (ikesia), of the mind (nous) with God containing [a request for] help or a request for good things.

29 A vow (euche) is the voluntary promise of good things.

30 Intercession (enteuxis) is an entreaty (paraklesis) being brought forth to God by a greater one concerning the salvation of others.

These characterizations are very similar to those of St John Cassian in Conferences 11–14.[13]

The most basic thing to be gained from this look at prayer in the Skemmata is the realization that for Evagrius pure prayer and Theology are identical.

To return to OTT, St Hesychios retains the understanding conveyed by this whole chapter of OTT, substantially quoting it in On Sobriety 89.[14]

This chapter does not correspond to any chapter of Peri Diakriseos in the Philokalia.

The next chapter, quite terse and difficult, focuses on the mental representations. In each contemplation, the mental representation of the object of contemplation is the vehicle by which the gnosis related to the contemplation is introduced into the mind (nous). Hence, Evagrius’ whole purpose in the next chapter is to distinguish among the ways in which the mind (nous) might receive a mental representation.

Apart from the terseness of Evagrius, the main difficulty is to ascertain just what he means by ‘forms a figure (schematizei)’. He has nowhere in OTT, or elsewhere as far as we know, explained the difference between ‘imprints (tuponei)’ and ‘forms a figure (schematizei)’. In their notes to OTT 41,[15] Gehin et al. quote Skemmata 17 in a way which suggests to us that to form a figure means to receive a visual likeness, as of a sensible object seen through the instrumentality of the eyes, whereas to imprint could refer to abstract mental representations for which there can be no visual image, such as might be received by the ear. However, Gehin et al. themselves treat the two terms as synonymous. We wonder about that, because it does not seem to be consistent with Evagrius’ style for him to engage in such pleonasm, nor with the meaning of Skemmata 17:

17 There are four ways by means of which the mind (nous) receives mental representations (noemata). And the first way, then, is by means of the eyes. The second, by means of the hearing. The third, by means of the memory. And the fourth, by means of the bodily constitution. And by means of the eyes, then, the mind (nous) only receives mental representations (noemata) which give a form to (morphounta) [the mind (nous)]. By means of the hearing, however, mental representations (noemata) which both give a form to (morphounta) [the mind (nous)] and do not give a form to (me morphounta) [the mind (nous)], so as to signify the word (logos) and things both sensible and contemplative (theoreta). The memory and the bodily constitution follow the hearing, for each gives a form to the mind (nous) and does not give a form to the mind, imitating the hearing.

It should be understood that Skemmata 17 is dealing with the mental representations of the common life of man—of ordinary sense-perception and its recollection.

In OTT 41, Evagrius introduces another category of mental representations, those that neither imprint nor form a figure. These are the mental representations of the higher stages of gnosis.

Finally, it is well to recall that Evagrius places the seat of the mind (nous) in the heart of man.

41 Of the mental representations, some imprint and form figures in our ruling part while others provide gnosis only, neither imprinting nor forming figures in the mind (nous). For the ‘In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God’ [John 1, 1] puts a certain mental representation into the heart but it neither forms a figure in nor imprints the heart.

The key to understanding this very difficult chapter is the first sentence. Evagrius is distinguishing between mental representations which imprint and form figures in the mind (nous) and mental representations which do not, but only convey a gnosis into the mind (nous). This is the fundamental distinction that Evagrius is drawing in this chapter. The kernel of Evagrius’ argument is that the first mental representations, those that imprint and form figures in the mind (nous), prevent the mind (nous) from receiving the second mental representations, those which convey gnosis into the mind (nous). This is an argument about types of mental representations: previously, we loosely said that each type of mental representation imprinted the mind (nous). That is true, but in the sense that each mental representation has an effect on the mind (nous). When in this chapter Evagrius says that some mental representations imprint the mind (nous) and form a figure in it, that some mental representations imprint the mind (nous) without forming a figure in it and that some mental representations neither imprint the mind (nous) nor form a figure in it, he is speaking of how each type of mental representation affects the mind (nous). For the mental representation must have some effect on the mind (nous); otherwise it and the related contemplation or gnosis would be unknowable by the mind (nous). Hence, what Evagrius is discussing are the different modes of intuitive apprehension of spiritual realities by the mind (nous), beginning with the basic mode of the sense-perception of material objects.

It is here that we can see the significance of two passages of the Kephalaia Gnostica, VI, 51 and 55,[16] for Evagrius’ contemplative psychology:

VI, 55 The mind (nous) applies itself to the intelligible things at that very time, when it should no longer be conformed (poiotai) by the thoughts (logismoi) from the passionate part of the soul.

VI, 51 If the rational part is the most honourable of all the powers of the soul—only this is conformed (poioutai) by wisdom—then superior to all the virtues should be wisdom, for our wise teacher also called it ‘the spirit of adoptive sonship’ [Rom. 8, 15].

What interests us here is the verb poiomai (to be conformed), as applied to the mind (nous), first in relation to the thoughts (logismoi) from the passionate part of the soul and then in relation to wisdom or gnosis. What Evagrius is describing is how each mental representation affects the mind (nous), first the impassioned mental representation and second the mental representation corresponding to the gnosis of the Holy Trinity. We have just seen Evagrius to say that some mental representations form figures in the mind (nous), some imprint the mind (nous) and some do neither. Here we see him to say that the mind (nous) is ‘conformed’ by the mental representation. He is saying the same thing. The characteristic of the mind (nous) is that it is conformed by mental representations. The reader might more easily grasp what Evagrius means if he here construes mind (nous) as ‘consciousness’: our consciousness ‘takes on the aspect’ of whatever mental representation it receives: when we receive by ordinary sense-perception the mental representation of a tree, say, then our consciousness is ‘conformed’ or ‘shaped’ by the image of the tree; when we receive in second natural contemplation the intelligible mental representation of the reason (logos) of the tree, then our consciousness is ‘conformed’ or ‘shaped’ by that intelligible mental representation of the reason (logos) of the tree—without for all that the mental representation of the reason (logos) of the tree forming a figure in our mind (nous). And so on for all the other mental representations that Evagrius is discussing. Our consciousness or mind (nous) has a certain special plasticity which allows it to be conformed by the mental representations that it receives.

We can now see Evagrius’ purpose in the present chapter of OTT: it is to discuss the ways our consciousness, or, more precisely, our mind (nous), can be conformed or shaped by the various kinds of mental representations, with a view to explaining why we must divest ourselves of the lower mental representations so as to attain to the higher mental representations, ultimately the mental representation of the Holy Trinity, where our mind (nous) is conformed by the gnosis of the Holy Trinity. This we experience as the Light of Tabor, or, in Evagrius’ terminology, the Light of Sinai.

To return to OTT, the mental representation of the beginning of St John’s Gospel bears a very exalted mental representation, a very exalted gnosis, into the mind (nous)—so exalted as to be rationally incomprehensible by man—, but it neither forms a figure in nor imprints the mind (nous). This is why that passage of the Gospel is rationally incomprehensible, in the sense of its not being, as a mental representation, subject to rational manipulation by the mind. We can manipulate the words; we can discuss the manuscript tradition of the passage; but the content of the passage, the mental representation itself, is rationally incomprehensible to us. The passage can only be heard spiritually; the mental representation can only be received spiritually; it cannot be analysed intellectually. The reason is that this passage of St John’s Gospel conveys a spiritual gnosis, a very exalted one, into the heart, and the mental representation of that gnosis is not of a type that can be rationally manipulated by man. As Evagrius says: ‘It neither forms a figure in nor imprints the heart.’

And the ‘taking bread’ [Luke 22, 19] forms a figure in the mind (nous),

We can easily imagine the act described in St Luke’s account of the Last Supper precisely because the mental representation of it forms a figure in our mind (nous). The reason that that mental representation forms a figure in the mind (nous) is that it refers to a concrete action of the man, Jesus Christ, that can be pictured in the mind (nous) as a concrete action seen. A mental representation that forms a figure in the mind (nous) we take to be the lowest form of mental representation after the mental representations received in sense-perception and after the mental representations arising from recollections of objects of sense. A mental representation that forms a figure in the mind (nous), such as Evagrius is here describing, is similar to the mental representation that arises from a recollection, whether impassioned or unimpassioned, of an object of sense initially received through the sight.

while the ‘he broke’ [Luke 22, 19], again, imprints the mind (nous).

We understand imprints not to be a synonym of forms a figure; hence, for us, Evagrius is asserting that ‘he broke’ does not as an isolated mental representation form a figure in the mind (nous), but it imprints it, precisely because ‘breaking’ is an abstract concept, whereas the act of taking bread is a concrete action. Of course, if one sees forms a figure as a synonym of imprints, then Evagrius is merely asserting that the two statements, being concrete, imprint the mind. We take the two to be distinct, although Gehin et al. take them to be synonymous. We take the mental representation that imprints the mind (nous) to be the next higher type of mental representation after the mental representation that forms a figure in the mind: it is one, to follow Skemmata 17, that is related more to the sense of hearing.

At this point, Evagrius ceases to use the term ‘forms a figure (schematizei)’, retaining only the term ‘imprints (tuponei)’.

The ‘I saw the Lord sitting on a high throne and lifted up’ [Isa. 6, 1] imprints the mind (nous) without the ‘I saw the Lord’; and what is said appears to imprint the mind (nous) while what is signified does not imprint [it]. For he saw with the prophetic eye the rational nature raised up by means of the practical life and receiving in itself the gnosis which is of God.

In our understanding, what Evagrius is saying is that ‘I saw the Lord’ does not imprint the mind (nous) because it refers to the gnosis of God, whereas the whole sentence without that phrase does imprint the mind (nous). Evagrius does not explain why the rest of the sentence does imprint the mind (nous). It seems to be because it refers to a concrete, visual image. Moreover, Evagrius seems to be saying, the particular verbal formulation of the rest of the sentence seems to imprint the mind (nous), referring as it does to the image of a high throne on which someone is sitting, but the actual meaning does not imprint the mind, for, according to Evagrius, the passage in reality refers to the rational nature raised up by means of the practical life and receiving in itself the gnosis of God. Evidently, Evagrius intends us to understand that the gnosis of God does not affect the mind (nous) in the same way that the lower mental representations affect the mind. The difference with the ‘he broke’ seems to be that that was an action that Jesus, the man, did, whereas, here, the passage of Scripture under consideration refers to the gnosis of God himself and not to the actual action of a man—Jesus Christ seen in his human nature. What Evagrius is driving at is that God is not knowable in the same way that created things and their reasons (logoi) are knowable. This is a basic feature of his mysticism: the ascetic can know God but not in the same way that he knows other things. Evagrius is attempting to distinguish between the mental representation that corresponds to the gnosis of God, and the lower mental representations that correspond to human actions, even abstract in nature, or even abstract and mixed with concrete visualizable actions.[17]

For there God is said to sit, there where he is known. Therefore the pure mind (nous) is also called the throne of God. And it is also said: ‘A throne of dishonour is the woman’—that is, the soul (psuche)—‘which hates justice.’ [Prov. 11, 16.] The dishonour of the soul (psuche), then, is vice and ignorance. Therefore the mental representation of God will not be found among those mental representations which imprint the mind (nous), but among those mental representations which do not imprint the mind (nous).

The last sentence is very important for an understanding of Evagrius’ contemplative psychology. The very difficult argument of Evagrius was leading up to this sentence. The mental representation is the vehicle of gnosis. That is why Evagrius can speak of the mental representation of God: the ascetic can receive the gnosis of the Holy Trinity into his mind (nous). However, Evagrius wants to assert, the mental representation of God is different from all mental representations of objects of sense—or, indeed, from all mental representations related to creatures—, in that the mental representation of God does not imprint the mind (nous). It is a different sort of mental representation from those that imprint the mind (nous). It affects the mind (nous) in a different way. Evagrius now draws his conclusion:

Wherefore it is necessary that he who is praying be separated absolutely from the mental representations which imprint the mind (nous).

Evagrius here emphasizes the necessity during the time of prayer of having the mind (nous) completely free of mental representations that imprint it. These include the mental representations of objects of sense and the recollections of objects of sense, whether impassioned or unimpassioned. All the mental representations which imprint the mind (nous) block the mental representation of God. Evidently, it is a fact of human cognitive psychology that a mental representation which imprints the mind (nous) prevents the mind (nous) from receiving a mental representation which does not imprint it. Moreover, the mental representations of objects of sense, because they imprint the mind (nous), also block the intelligible mental representations of natural contemplation, which themselves do not imprint the mind (nous). That is why dispassion (apatheia) is a precondition of natural contemplation, and why the senses must be divested in the passage from second to first natural contemplation. As should be clear, the mental representations which do not imprint the mind (nous) are the mental representations of intelligible things such as the reasons (logoi) of objects of sense, the angels themselves, the reasons (logoi) of angels and, of course, the mental representation of God himself.

This is the answer to the question that Evagrius posed in OTT 22 and said he would answer in the ‘chapters on prayer’.

St Hesychios, in the context of the Hesychasm of the School of Sinai following Evagrius, St Mark the Ascetic and St John of Sinai on the psychology of contemplation, will discuss at great length the practice of keeping the intellect of the Hesychast free of mental representations that imprint the mind. St Hesychios will call this the ‘guard of the mind (nous)’. It will be somewhat easier for us to follow St Hesychios’ argument in On Sobriety, since he speaks at somewhat greater length than Evagrius, but it must be conceded that the matter is difficult.

And you will investigate if, indeed, as it is in regard to the bodies and their reasons (logoi), thus it is also in regard to the bodiless [powers] and their reasons (logoi).

Evagrius now turns to discuss the second and first natural contemplations respectively. First, he implies that there is a difference between the mental representation of the object of sense and the mental representation of the reason (logos) of that object of sense. This is a fundamental distinction to grasp. The one is a sense-perception received by the mind (nous) by means of an organ of sense, or even by means of the recollection, whether impassioned or not, of an object of sense; the other is the mental representation of an intelligible, the reason (logos) of the object of sense. Evagrius then implies that as concerns the mental representation that the ascetic receives into his mind (nous), there is an analogy between the object of sense and its reason (logos), and the angel and its reason (logos). For, Evagrius intends us to understand, we can contemplate an angel and we can contemplate the reason (logos) of the angel, but the two mental representations are not the same. Evagrius goes on to explain his meaning:

And in one way will the mind (nous) be imprinted when it sees a mind (nous) and otherwise will it be disposed when it sees the reason (logos) of that mind (nous).

Recall that in Evagrius’ system all the bodiless powers are minds (noes) of the same sort as the minds (noes) of men. So Evagrius is here talking about the angelic powers and saying that the ascetic’s mind (nous) apprehends the angel, taken as a mind (nous), in one way, and the reason (logos) of that angel in another way. For the passage to be read in a fashion consistent with the rest of the chapter, we cannot take ‘imprints’ literally here, since the chapter elsewhere establishes that only the mental representations of objects of sense imprint the mind (nous). In regard to the mental representation of angels, we must take ‘imprints’ analogically. As for the point that the mental representation of the angel is different from the mental representation of the reason (logos) of the angel, let us remark that angels, just as sensible objects do, have their raisons d’être in the Mind of God and that it is a different thing to know Sally than it is to know God’s plan for Sally and her friends.

Hence, we know how the spiritual gnosis puts the mind (nous) away from the mental representations which imprint it, and presents it, then, to God without imprint, because the mental representation of God is not among the mental representations which imprint the mind (nous)—for God is not a body—but among those mental representations which do not imprint the mind (nous).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the ‘spiritual gnosis’ that Evagrius is here referring to is natural contemplation in its higher forms, what in OTT 40 and Skemmata 23 he calls ‘spiritual contemplation’. This spiritual gnosis liberates the mind (nous) from the lower mental representations, those which imprint it, and presents it to God without imprint. To be able to apprehend God intuitively, mystically, the ascetic must have his mind (nous) free of mental representations which imprint his mind (nous): those mental representations block his apprehension of the mental representation of God. Evagrius’ reason is that the mental representation of God is ‘among the mental representations which do not imprint the mind (nous)’. Evagrius will clarify his reason in the next chapter. It should here be noted that in passing to the mental representation of God, the ascetic divests himself even of the mental representations of the spiritual gnosis related to natural contemplation.

Recall here that the mental representations which imprint the mind (nous) include not only the impassioned mental representations of objects of sense, but also the ‘mere’ unimpassioned mental representations of objects of sense. It is also well to recall that according to the interpretation of St Isaac the Syrian,[18] entry into first natural contemplation involves the divestiture by the ascetic of the senses. We here see that, in the language of mental representations, this divestiture of the senses enables the ascetic to divest himself even of the ‘mere’ unimpassioned mental representations of sensible objects: these are the final mental representations that imprint the mind (nous) of the ascetic. Hence, in passing from the second to the first natural contemplation, the ascetic is not only divesting himself of the senses but also divesting himself of the ‘mere’ mental representations that imprint his mind (nous), so that he might receive the higher mental representations that do not imprint the mind (nous), especially the mental representation of God himself. Note, however, that the mental representations of natural contemplation exist in a hierarchy, and that the mental representation of God is both above them all and characterized by such things as non-duality.[19]

The gnosis of God, the highest gnosis, is received into the mind (nous) without figures and without imprinting or moulding of the mind (nous), and even without cognition of an object of contemplation. Something else more elevated is involved. That something else is the mental representation of God. Implicit in what Evagrius is saying is that God is known (indeed, in the form of light), but he is not apprehended in the same way that objects of sense, objects of sense recalled, imaginations, fantasies, the reasons (logoi) of objects of sense, or even angels and their reasons (logoi) are apprehended by the mind (nous). The mystical ascent is a purification from all mental representations, including those of natural contemplation, until, completely emptied of such mental representations, the mind (nous) can then receive the mental representation, the gnosis, of God. However, this purification has a certain natural sequence: it is precisely the sequence of the four transformations: the transformation of the passionate part of the soul from vice to virtue in the practical life, the transformation from dispassion (apatheia) to the second natural contemplation, the transformation from the second to the first natural contemplation, the transformation from the first natural contemplation to Theology. It is by means of this sequence of transformations that the mind (nous) is purified so as to be able to receive the mental representation of God. For the mental representation of God not only does not imprint the mind but also is far higher and more subtle than all the mental representations of natural contemplation, which themselves do not even imprint the mind. In comparison to the mental representation of God, however, they are gross. This is precisely the significance of the soaring mystical ascent that we have referred to: it accomplishes the final purification of the mind (nous) from the lower mental representations of natural contemplation, even though not even those mental representations imprint the mind.

As we have already remarked, St Hesychios follows this program of freeing the mind (nous) from all mental representations that imprint the mind (nous) and of keeping the mind (nous) completely empty. Following St John of Sinai, he calls this practice the ‘guard of the mind (nous)’. This guard of the mind (nous) is the highest stage of sobriety in the Hesychian system prior to the advent of the Holy Spirit. It is central to St Hesychios’ doctrine of contemplation.[20]

Again, of those things which are contemplated which do not imprint the mind (nous), some, on the one hand, signify the substance of the bodiless [powers], while the others, on the other hand, signify their reasons (logoi).

Among the mental representations which do not imprint the mind (nous) are included the mental representations of the angels themselves—this is the meaning of the phrase ‘substance of the bodiless [powers]’—and the mental representations of the reasons (logoi) of the angels. What is the mental representation of an angel? In some fashion, the angel, an objectively existing being with a mind (nous) that the ascetic encounters in contemplation, is cognized or apprehended by the mind (nous) of the ascetic. But the angel is not an object of sense. Hence, we say that the ascetic receives the mental representation of the very angel itself, but that that mental representation of the angel does not imprint the mind. The intuitive cognition or apprehension of the angel is a different sort of thing from the sensible apprehension by the mind (nous) of an object of sense. Moreover, Evagrius is pointing out, the ascetic can also intuitively cognize or apprehend the reason (logos) of the angel, and that mental representation of the reason (logos) of the angel is actually different from the mental representation of the angel itself.

This passage seems to assert that all the mental representations of intelligible things, from the reasons (logoi) of objects of sense through to the mental representations of angels and the mental representations of the reasons (logoi) of angels, do not imprint the mind and we have applied this interpretation in our discussion of the preceding parts of this chapter.

And it does not occur thus in reference to the bodiless [powers] as it occurs in reference to the bodies. For with regard to the bodies some [mental representations] imprinted the mind (nous) while the others did not imprint [it]. Here, neither mental representation imprints the mind (nous).

Here, Evagrius makes clear his meaning: the mental representations of objects of sense imprint the mind (nous)[21] whereas the mental representations of intelligible things such as the reasons (logoi) of objects of sense do not imprint the mind (nous). Moreover, Evagrius asserts in the last sentence, neither the mental representation of the angel itself nor the mental representation of the reason (logos) of the angel imprints the mind (nous).

This chapter does not correspond to any chapter of Peri Diakriseos in the Philokalia.

The next chapter is quite simple, being a clarification of the concept of the spiritual sense that we have already encountered, both in Chapter III of Volume I and in the Digression, in passages from the Kephalaia Gnostica.

42 The demonic thoughts make the left eye of the soul quite blind, the one giving its attention to the contemplations of things which have come to be.

The passage to here is parallel to Skemmata 24.

The ‘contemplations of things which have come to be’ is natural contemplation. Evagrius is saying that the impassioned mental representations of objects of sense, those that are the commencement of a demonic thought (logismos), make that power of the soul quite blind that is giving its attention to natural contemplation. In other words, to the extent that the ascetic has not achieved dispassion (apatheia) and is still subject to accepting demonically sown impassioned recollections of objects of sense that evolve into demonic thoughts (logismoi), then he is unable to engage in natural contemplation. Here, Evagrius is presenting this as an impossibility on the grounds of his psychology of contemplation. Recall that in TPL 61 Evagrius asserted that the problem with the ascetic who had not attained to dispassion (apatheia) but who entered into natural contemplation was that disturbances of the passions would force him to return whence he came. There, Evagrius was speaking from the point of view of the role of the passions.

The mental representations which imprint and form figures in our ruling part make quite turbid the right eye, the one which contemplates during the time of prayer the blessed light of the Holy Trinity, by means of which eye the bride in the Songs of Songs ravished the heart of the Bridegroom himself [cf. S. of S. 4, 9].

Here, Evagrius clarifies why the mental representations which imprint and form figures in the mind (nous) prevent the ascetic from receiving the mental representation of God. The mental representations which imprint and form figures in the mind (nous)—sense-perceptions, impassioned recollections and the ‘mere’ recollections of objects of sense uncharged by passion—make quite turbid that other power of the mind (nous), the faculty that apprehends intuitively the mental representation of God, here described as the blessed light of the Holy Trinity. We earlier said that the mental representations which imprinted the mind (nous) cluttered the mind (nous); here we see Evagrius’ formal explanation of the matter.

And with this very charming image of the right eye of the mind (nous) that ravishes the heart of the Bridegroom, an image that St Hesychios will echo in On Sobriety 131—‘The mind, amazed, lovingly glorifies God, who is seen and who sees, and who, on account of the one and the other, saves him who gazes thus towards him.’—we close our study of Evagrius. The final chapter, OTT 43, is a short summary in the form of an exhortation. It needs no commentary.

It should be remarked that the Skemmata contains material that both parallels OTT and the Kephalaia Gnostica and clarifies their higher doctrine. We have integrated many passages of the Skemmata into our commentary, but the reader who has assimilated the content of our work would do well to continue on to study the Skemmata.

This chapter does not correspond to any chapter of Peri Diakriseos in the Philokalia.

43 Desiring pure prayer, watch the temper closely, and, being fond of chastity, become master of your stomach. Do not give bread to your belly in satiety and in water distress it greatly. Keep vigil in prayer and put rancour far from you. Let not the words of the Holy Spirit fail you, and knock on the door of Scripture with the hands of the virtues. Then dispassion of heart will rise upon you and you will in prayer see the mind (nous) in the form of a star.

This chapter corresponds to the last part of Chapter 23, the final chapter, of Peri Diakriseos in the Philokalia. The first part of Chapter 23 of Peri Diakriseos is not included in the critical edition of OTT of Gehin et al.; it is, however, included as Appendix 1 to it. It is a short summary of the doctrine of Chapter 1 of the critical edition of OTT, which itself is found as Chapter 1 of Peri Diakriseos.

We will now, in the next volume, turn to St Hesychios. Readers who are unsettled by the fact that the mystical theology of Evagrius contains a healthy dose of heresy should be relieved. Although the School of Sinai—St John of Sinai, St Hesychios and others—use Evagrius, they are careful to distance themselves from his heretical dogmas. Hence, while they use Evagrius’ psychology of ascesis, his psychology of contemplation and the broad outlines of his doctrine of mystical ascent, their works are free of his heterodox cosmological doctrines. The reader can relax and enjoy the School of Sinai. Indeed, we would remark that the reader, if he or she wishes, is now in a position to read St John Cassian, St Diadochos of Photike, St Maximos the Confessor, St Isaac the Syrian, St John of Sinai, or any of a number of other ascetical writers who were greatly influenced by Evagrius. We ourselves will continue with On Sobriety. It should be remarked, however, that St Hesychios builds on Evagrius’ psychology of ascesis and contemplation, so that the better the reader understands this volume, the easier it will be for him to follow the next.

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[1] Loc. cit.

[2] See Chapter IV of Volume I.

[3] Loosely put.

[4] KG V, 12 and elsewhere.

[5] KG III, 56.

[6] Sinkewicz pp. 284–5, fns. 2–3.

[7] Migne 150, col. 1081B, ll. 8–14 and col. 1081B, ll. 4–8 respectively.

[8] See above.

[9] See Section 9, Chapter III, of Volume I.

[10] This might seem to fly in the face of his allusion to the differing glories of the stars, since they too in the Evagrian system are reasonable beings.

[11] Evagrius states this in KG IV, 67. See also Section 5, Chapter III, of Volume I.

[12] See also KG III, 56, discussed in the Digression.

[13] Cassian C.

[14] See Volume III.

[15] OTT G p. 291, fn. 2.

[16] Greek fragments. See in Appendix 2 the footnotes to the chapters in the Kephalaia Gnostica for information on the provenance of the fragments.

[17] We ignore the Evagrian Christology here, and treat the references to Jesus Christ as completely Orthodox.

[18] Loc. cit.

[19] KG IV, 77; IV, 87; etc.

[20] See Volume III.

[21] The distinction here between the mental representations of bodies which imprint the mind (nous) and the mental representations of bodies which do not imprint the mind (nous) we take to be the distinction between the mental representation of the object received in sense-perception and the mental representation of its reason (logos) received in second natural contemplation. We ignore here the distinction Evagrius draws in Skemmata 17 between mental representations of objects of sense that form figures in the mind (those received by the eyes) and those that do not (those received primarily by the hearing). However, it is clear that in Evagrius’ view the mental representations of sense-perception do not all affect the mind (nous) in the same way.